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1 Introduction
This paper investigates in a laboratory experiment whether pre-play com-
munication helps achieving the efficient equilibrium in a coordination game
among three players. The game under study (the coalitional prisoner’s dilem-
ma, see Figure 1) has two Pareto-ranked pure strategy Nash equilibria, and
each pair of players has a profitable joint deviation from the Pareto-dominant
equilibrium. In particular, we study how the structure of communication, i.e.
who is talking with whom, influences the choice of messages, the beliefs and
the choice of the players in this game.
Communication may help the players to coordinate on a Nash equilibrium.
Suppose players meet before the game and engage in pre-play communica-
tion. If an agreement is reached in the meeting, it has to be a Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore, if the game features Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria, the com-
mon perception is that communication helps achieving the Pareto-dominant
one. Experiments in 2 by 2 stag hunt games have shown that communication
indeed leads to higher rate of coordination on the efficient equilibrium [e.g.
Charness, 2000; Cooper et al., 1992]. In this paper, we analyze whether the
structure of communication affects coordination and efficiency.
In the experiment, the subjects play eight rounds of the coalitional pris-
oner’s dilemma, under strangers matching. We implement a between-subjects
design, with four treatments. The treatments differ in the structure of pre-
play communication. Communication takes the form of structured messages,
by which agents reveal their intended action.
In a baseline treatment, players do not communicate (NoCom). Each of the
other treatments implements one of the possible symmetric communication
structures. These are: i) Public: each player sends a public message to both of
the other group members; ii) Private: each player sends a private message to
each of the other group members; iii) Both: each player sends both the private
and the public messages to the other group members.
Theoretical models on pre-play communication in games of complete in-
formation focus on 2-player games.1,2 These papers assume that messages
1See Farrell [1988, 1995], Rabin [1994] and Farrell and Rabin [1996]. A review of the theo-
retical literature can be found in Crawford [1998].
2Here we focus on the communication of intentions of play. A different, though related,
literature addresses communication about the state of the world in sender-receiver games
with incomplete information [see Blume et al., 1993; Crawford and Sobel, 1982]. In particular,
a number of studies have investigated information revelation under different communica-
tion structures. Farrell and Gibbons [1989] compared private and public communication in
sender-receiver games with multiple audiences. Battaglini and Makarov [2014] provided an
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pointing at a Nash equilibrium are credible because they are self-committing:
if believed, they create the incentive to play according to them. Grandjean
and Mantovani [2014] have extended this notion of credibility to games with
more than two players, and arbitrary communication structures. A profile
of messages in a group of communicating players is self-committing if each
player in the group is better-off by playing his message when he trusts the
messages revealed by the other group members. A profile of messages in a
group is credible if it is self-committing, and no group member can improve
on it by following a self-committing agreement of another group. The struc-
ture of communication thus plays a key role in the determination of the cred-
ibility of agreements. Following this approach, we characterize the credible
equilibria of the game, i.e. the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game where
it is assumed that agents trust credible messages and use the messages they
observe to update their beliefs about the messages they do not observe.
In Public, an agreement to play the Pareto-dominant equilibrium is cred-
ible. The only credible equilibrium is such that each player reveals his in-
tention to play the action associated to the Pareto-dominant equilibrium, and
plays that action if each player has also communicated in this way. In Private
and Both, an agreement to play the action associated to the Pareto-dominant
equilibrium is not credible since any pair of agents could jointly deviate from
it by coordinating privately. In these treatments, the players choose the action
associated to the Pareto dominated equilibrium after every communication
history in a credible equilibrium. In that sense, communication is uninforma-
tive and should be disregarded.
Our results show that the communication structure has a huge impact
on play. Absent communication, miscoordination is initially high and play
quickly converges to the dominated equilibrium. Coordination on pure strat-
egy Nash equilibria is higher in the first rounds with communication. In pub-
lic, the efficient equilibrium is played by more than half of the groups, steadily
across rounds. A vast majority of the players announce their intention to play
the action corresponding to the Pareto-dominant equilibrium, and play ac-
cordingly only when others do so as well. When private communication is
allowed, the dominated equilibrium ends up being played by most groups
in the last rounds. Lying is prevalent: players try to convince one of their
partners to play the Pareto-dominant equilibrium, while agreeing on a devia-
tion with the other. This strategy is frequently successful because some agents
experimental test of the model.
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trust messages that are not credible, especially in the earlier rounds. As a
result, and contrary to the theoretical hypothesis, the outcome of communi-
cation affects beliefs even under Private and Both, where messages should be
considered uninformative.
In two-player games, the only possible variation to the structure of com-
munication distinguishes one-sided and two-sided communication. Cooper
et al. [1992, 1989] found that one-sided communication is more effective in the
battle of the sexes, where some symmetry-breaking device is needed, while
two-sided is more effective in the stag hunt.3,4
Relatively few papers have studied the role of cheap talk in games with
more than two-players.5 Blume and Ortmann [2007] found that communi-
cation improves coordination and efficiency in the weak-link and the median
game, which both feature Pareto-ranked equilibria and perfectly aligned inter-
ests. In Moreno and Wooders [1998], two players with common interests and
opposed to those of the third one communicate to coordinate and correlate
their actions. Castillo and Leo [2007] allowed the players to chat freely both
publicly and privately. Some of their subjects use communication to organize
deviations, betting on the partial sophistication of their partners. Choi and
Lee [2014] studied a multi-player battle of the sexes, where structured com-
munication takes place on different network structures. They showed that the
level of coordination and the equilibria that are reached depend on the net-
work structure. In their design, the players cannot send different messages to
different audiences.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the game and the
theoretical framework. The experimental design and procedures follow in
Section 3. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
X Y
X 8,8,8 0,0,0
Y 0,0,0 16,16,0
X
X Y
X 0,0,0 0,16,16
Y 16,0,16 4,4,4
Y
FIGURE 1: THE COALITIONAL PRISONER’S DILEMMA.
3Related to this result, it has been pointed out that, in situations where agents face strate-
gic risk, mutual communication of intentions may have a reassuring effect [see Brandts et al.,
2012; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006, 2011].
4Andersson and Wengström [2012] allow for intra-game communication, and show how
this can work, through renegotiation, against efficient coordination in dynamic settings.
5Crawford [1998] surveyed the early literature on two-player games. A more recent one
can be found in Charness and Dufwenberg [2007]
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2 Credibility in the coalitional prisoner’s dilemma
2.1 The game
The game we investigate is depicted in Figure 1. The set of players is N =
{i, j,k}, and the action space of any player l ∈ N is Al = {X,Y}. We denote by
x, y the message announcing a player’s intention to play X and Y. Let XYY be
a shortcut notation for the profiles of actions where one player chooses X, and
the others choose Y, and let XXX, XXY, and YYY be defined accordingly.
There are two pure strategy Nash equilibria: XXX and YYY. The game
belongs to the class of coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria and
XXX is the Pareto-dominant equilibrium (PDE). There also exists a mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium where all players play X with probability 1+
√
2
3
∼=
.805, leading to an expected payoff of 5.18.
The structure of the game is similar to the example introduced in Bernheim
et al. [1987] to motivate the notion of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. In
particular, the agreement to play XXX is not immune to the deviation YY by
any two players, which is self-enforceable, since the agents who have initiated
the deviation do not want to further deviate. Following the same argument,
the deviation from YYY to XXX is not self-enforceable and YYY is the unique
coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of the game.6
When groups of two agents may coordinate their moves, agreeing on XY
or YX does not make sense since the agent playing X is sure of getting his
worst payoff. Among the other possible strategies, the two agents are strictly
better off by playing YY over XX. If the third agent anticipates this, he should
play Y as well. Iterated elimination of ‘coalitionally dominated strategies’
leads to the selection of the Pareto-dominated equilibrium.7 Because this fea-
ture recalls the prisoner’s dilemma, except for defection being defined over
coalitions rather than individuals, we label this game the coalitional prisoner’s
dilemma (CPD).
2.2 Credible communication
Grandjean and Mantovani [2014] analyzed the credibility of pre-play commu-
nication in games of complete information. They extended the notion of self-
6Notably, Bernheim et al. [1987] explicitly mention “unconstrained communication” in
their justification of the concept. Milgrom and Roberts [1996] proposed a form of (correlated)
coalition-proof equilibrium where the set of feasible coalitions can be arbitrarily restricted.
7See Ambrus [2006] for a noncooperative solution concept based on this procedure.
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committing messages to n-player games, and arbitrary communication struc-
tures. Building on this, they proposed a notion of credible communication
that is sensible to the communication structure, and a related solution concept
– the credible equilibrium. We here describe informally how these concepts
apply to our game, and use them to derive the experimental hypotheses. A
formal account can be found in Appendix B.
A communication structure is a collection of groups of players. In each
group, agents simultaneously announce their intended action to the other
group members. We focus on the symmetric communication structures among
three players: (i) no communication; (ii) (public) communication in the group
of all players; (iii) (private) communication in each group of two players; (iv)
communication in the group of all players, and in each group of two players.
Within each group, a message profile is self-committing if each player is
better off by playing his message when he trusts the messages of the other
group members, for any belief he may hold about nonmembers.8 In groups of size
two, the only message profile that is self-committing is (y,y). Only in that
case agents prefer to stick to their announcement if they believe the other’s
message, whatever the choice of the third player. In the group of all players,
the two message profiles corresponding to the pure strategy Nash equilibria
of the game are self-committing.
In a group, a message profile that is not self-committing leads to a con-
sensus to play an action profile other than the message profile if (i) the players
who do not play according to their message choose a best-response to the mes-
sage of those who stick to it, (ii) the message of the players who stick to it is
a best-response to the play of the consensus, and (iii) there is no other action
profile satisfying (i) and (ii). In a group of two players, the message profile
where one player reveals his intention to play Y while the other player an-
nounces his plan to play X is not self-committing, but it leads to a consensus
where the two players choose Y. The x-sender should play Y if he believes the
y-sender (part (i)). Given this reaction, the y-sender should play his message
(part (ii)). If the y-sender believes the x-sender, he will stick to his message
for some beliefs about the play of the third player (part (iii)). In the group of
three players, if two players communicate x and the remaining player com-
8Aumann [1990] noted that a player may have incentives to send a self-committing mes-
sage even if he is planning to play something else. In that case, the message is not self-
signaling and should not be credible. In our game, this tension does not occur. A player who
convinces another to play Y would not do so if he intended to play X. Similarly in public, a
player who is planning to play Y should not try to convince the others to play X. See Charness
[2000] and Clark et al. [2001] for experimental tests of Aumann’s conjecture.
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municates y, players would agree on the play of the PDE if the message of the
x-senders is believed and the message of the y-sender is not. They would also
agree on the dominated equilibrium if they believe the message y. Thus, no
consensus is reached following this message profile since two action profiles
satisfy part (i) and (ii) of the definition. If two players communicate y and
one communicates x in the group of three players, a consensus to play the
dominated equilibrium is reached. If the players believe at least one message
y, they should play Y. On the other hand, if the y-senders only believe the x-
sender, they could take both action, depending on their belief about the play
of the third player.
A self-committing messages profile, or a consensus, is called an agreement.
Agreements within a group are not credible per se, as one wants them to be ro-
bust to messages that are exchanged in other groups. An agreement is credible
in a group if there are no members of that group that could gain by follow-
ing the agreement reached in another group they also belong to. If players
can communicate only in public or only in private, all agreements are credi-
ble. When agents may communicate both in public and in private, the public
agreement (x, x, x) is not credible because any pair of agents could agree on Y
by communicating privately. Agreements to play Y are, instead, credible.
A credible equilibrium is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game with
pre-play communication where agents condition their choices on the mes-
sages observed, given that credible message profiles are believed.
If there is only public communication, in a credible equilibrium the play-
ers play the PDE after observing (x, x, x) and play Y if at least two y are sent.
If they observe only one y message, no agreement is reached and the players
could play any equilibrium of the stage game. There are credible equilibria
where agents send a message y with positive probability. However, commu-
nicating y is weakly dominated. If communicating y matters for the selection
of the equilibrium, it leads to an equilibrium with a smaller payoff to each
player. This occurs when the two other players reveal their intention to play
X while players do not play the PDE following xxy. It is also the case when
one other player communicates y and players do not play the dominated equi-
librium following xxy. In the other cases, the choice of the message of a player
does not affect the outcome of the game.9
If there is only private communication, the play of an agent depends on
9This occurs if the two others communicate y, if they communicate x and the credible equi-
librium following xxy is such that the PDE is played, or if one communicates x, the other y,
and the credible equilibrium following xxy is such that the dominated equilibrium is played.
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the two messages he sends and on the two messages he receives. As there is a
credible agreement in any couple where at least one y message has been sent,
the players choose Y after observing at least one y message. After observing
only x messages, a player updates his beliefs about the likelihood that the
two other agents have exchanged at least one y message, and chooses a best-
response. As shown in Appendix B, there does not exist a symmetric credible
equilibrium such that agents play X with positive probability. Intuitively, for
agents to play X with positive probabilities at a credible equilibrium, it must
be that they send message x to both partners with high probability. If it were
not the case, an agent observing only x messages would correctly anticipate
that the others have exchanged at least a y with high probability, and his best-
response would be to play Y. However, if the agents sent message x to both
partners with high probability, and responded to the observation of only x
messages by playing X, then an agent would have a profitable deviation in
the communication stage by revealing the intention to play y to one of the
others.
If there are both private and public communication, we have seen that
agents cannot credibly reveal their intention to play X. An agent plays Y after
any public or private credible agreement to do so. When an agent observes
at most one public y message, and only private x message, he chooses an op-
timal action given his equilibrium beliefs. With an argument identical to the
one used for private communication alone, we can show that the only sym-
metric credible equilibria of the game are such that all players choose Y with
probability one, independently of the messages (see Appendix B).
As credible equilibria are babbling whenever private communication is
present, any communication strategy can be part of an equilibrium. However,
under our notion of credibility, communicating y to both of the other players,
either with a public message or with two private ones, is weakly dominated:
it is always weakly better to convince only one other player to play Y, using
private messages.
By following the literature [e.g. Rabin, 1994], and assuming that multiple
stages are used to negotiate agreements, but that play is conditioned on the
messages observed in the last stage of communication, our results carry over
to the case of multiple stages of simultaneous communication.
We derive the following hypotheses from the theoretical analysis.
Hypothesis 1. (i) If only public communication is allowed, the players always play X
after observing (x, x, x), Y if at least two players send y. (ii) If private communication
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is allowed, the players play Y irrespective of the observed messages.
Hypothesis 2. (i) Players communicate x publicly. ii) Players do not communicate
y to both partners privately.10
These hypotheses imply the following comparative statics across commu-
nication structures. Coordination on pure strategy Nash equilibria is higher if
communication is allowed with respect to no communication. Coordination
on the PDE is higher when only public communication is allowed than under
any other communication structure. Finally, public communication is also the
only structure where communication affects beliefs.
3 Experimental design and procedures
We run four treatments. In each treatment, the subjects played eight rounds
of the CPD depicted in Figure 1. The payoffs, in experimental currency units
(ECU), were rescaled by a factor of ten. The treatment variable was the struc-
ture of pre-play communication. Each treatment implemented one of the four
symmetric communication structures described in Section 2. Each subject took
part only in one treatment.
In a baseline condition (NoCom), there was no pre-play communication. In
Public, each player sent a single message to both of the other group members.
In Private, each player sent a message to each of the other group members.
In Both, each player sent a message to both, and a message to each of the
other group members. The subjects had to send a message when given the
opportunity – i.e. they could not opt out from communication.
When pre-play communication was allowed, each round included four
communication stages. In every stage, the players exchanged structured mes-
sages. Each message was in the form “I intend to choose action X (Y)”. All mes-
sages were received simultaneously. At the end of the communication phase,
the subjects had to choose a pure action between X and Y. Agents could see
the exchanged messages in that round when choosing a message or an action.
We elicited first order beliefs, asking the following question: “Co-player 1
and Co-player 2 will choose between X and Y. What do you think they are going to
choose? Please enter a number between 0 and 100, representing the probability that
Co-Player 1(2) chooses X.”.
10We note that sending y to everybody is no longer weakly dominated if the players care
about promise keeping [see Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004; Gneezy, 2005].
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After answering, they were asked the following question, eliciting second
order beliefs: “Co-player 1 and Co-player 2 also answered the same question as you
did. Regarding you, what number do you think they entered? Please enter a number
between 0 and 100, representing the probability with which Co-player 1(2) thinks
you are choosing X.” Thus, we elicit probabilistic first order beliefs, and point
second order beliefs.11
Beliefs were incentivized using a quadratic scoring rule.12 Let b1stij and
b2ndij be the first and second order belief stated by player i relative to player j,
and taking value in [0,1]. The chosen action of player j is aj ∈ {0,1}, where
aj = 0 indicates that player j’s choice is Y, while aj = 1 indicates that player j’s
choice is X. The payoff for the belief tasks, expressed in ECU, were: 25 · (1−
(aj − b1stij )2) and 25 · (1− (b1stji − b2
nd
ij )
2), for the first and second order beliefs,
respectively.13
In NoCom, the belief tasks were taken after the action phase, before receiv-
ing feedback on the game. In all communication treatments we elicited the be-
liefs twice. The subjects took the tasks once before the communication phase,
and a second time after they had chosen an action, before receiving feedback
on the game. As the beliefs were stated before and after communication, we
will refer to the first as prior beliefs, to the second as posterior beliefs. In to-
tal the players completed four belief tasks in each round under NoCom, eight
tasks in the other treatments.
Summing up, the players stated their prior beliefs, communicated for four
stages, chose their action, stated their posterior beliefs, and received feedback
on the game and on the belief tasks. Only the last three steps were imple-
mented in NoCom.
The players repeated this procedure eight times. We refer to these repeti-
tions as rounds. We used a constrained stranger matching. The subjects were
informed that they were being re-matched in every round with a new group of
players. They were guaranteed they would not play twice in the same group
with the same two co-players. We formed matching group of six people (at
random). In every new round the players were re-matched with players in
11Second order beliefs are expressed as probabilities, but not as a probability distribution
over probabilities.
12As shown by Savage [1971] the quadratic scoring rule is proper, meaning that the ex-
pected utility is uniquely maximized when the stated probabilities are equal to the true prob-
abilities, under some restrictions on the players’ preferences.
13The subjects were not provided with these formulas, but with tables reporting the possi-
ble payoffs from different combinations of choices and stated beliefs. A copy of the tables can
be found in Appendix A.
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their own matching group. The sequence of matching was predetermined to
ensure that no group appeared twice in the sequence. The assignments of
subjects to terminals, of terminals to matching groups, and of labels within
the matching group were random. As a consequence, so was the sequence of
groups for each individual subject.
This procedure allowed us to collect one independent observation every
six subjects, while preventing repeated game effects. We point out that all the
information given to the subjects was correct.
The computerized experiment was run at the WZB-TU Experimental Lab
in Berlin, in June 2013, and involved 210 subjects, distributed over 12 exper-
imental sessions. Fifty-four subjects took part in NoCom, Private and Both;
forty-eight subjects took part in Public.14 Sessions took on average 45 minutes.
The computerized program was developed using Z-tree [Fischbacher, 2007].
Table 1 summarizes sessions’ details.
All sessions followed an identical procedure. After subjects were allowed
to enter into the lab, instructions were read aloud.15 Participants were asked
to fill in a control questionnaire. The experiment started only when all the
subjects had correctly completed the task.
Session Participants Matching groups(Ind. Obs) Treatment
1 18 3 Public
2 18 3 Private
3 18 3 Both
4 18 3 Private
5 18 3 Both
6 12 2 Public
7 18 3 Private
8 18 3 Both
9 18 3 NoCom
10 18 3 NoCom
11 18 3 NoCom
12 18 3 Public
TABLE 1: SESSIONS
14As some subjects did not show up in one session, we were forced to give up one matching
group.
15The experiment was conducted in German. An English version of the experimental in-
structions is available in Appendix A.
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After completing the eight rounds, subjects were asked to fill in a ques-
tionnaire. We gathered qualitative information about the expectations from
the game, the opponent, and the strategy followed. We recorded their assess-
ment on the credibility of communication, and its role in the game. Finally,
we elicited self-reported quantitative measures of trust and risk preferences,
using the questions of the SOEP German Panel.16
Subjects were told they would have been paid according to the ECU earned
in one stage game, and in one belief task, selected at random by the computer.
At the end of each round the computer selected one of the belief tasks to be
relevant for payment in case that round was selected. After the last round the
computer drew two numbers for each individual, between 1 and 8, without
replacement. The stage game and the relevant belief task in the corresponding
rounds were paid to the subjects, according to the exchange rate: 10ECU = 1AC.
Thus subjects could earn between 0 and 16 Euros from the stage game, and
between 0 and 2.50 Euros from the belief task. The subjects knew they could
not be paid for the stage game and the belief task from the same round. This
prevents them from hedging their action using the belief tasks. The average
payment, including 5 Euros of show-up fee, was around 13.70 Euros.
4 Results
4.1 Aggregate outcomes
Figure 2 shows the aggregate outcomes for each treatment. Subjects coordi-
nate more than half of the time on the PDE in Public, whereas they virtually
never play it in the other treatments. On the other hand, the dominated equi-
librium is played 23 percent of the time in Public, but more than half of the
time in the other treatments. A Komogorov-Smirnov test (KS) confirms that
the distribution of aggregate outcomes is different only when comparing Pub-
lic with each of the other treatments. A Wilkoxon rank-sum test (WRS) con-
firms that the fraction groups playing the PDE is higher in Public than in any
other treatment (see Table 2).17,18
Coordination on pure strategy Nash equilibria is higher when subjects
16For the use of the risk questions to measure risk preferences, see Dohmen et al. [2011]
17All the tests that will be shown are based on one independent observation for each
matching group.
18The variable ‘outcome’ is categorical. The variable for ‘outcome PDE’ is binary. How-
ever, the tests are run on averages over rounds for each matching group. These averages are
continuous, which makes the reported tests applicable.
11
FIGURE 2: AGGREGATE OUTCOMES
communicate. The fraction of equilibrium outcomes ranges from 75 percent
in Public to 55 percent in NoCom. Using a WRS test, the fraction of equilib-
rium outcomes in NoCom is significantly different than in Public, Both, and
the aggregation of communication treatments. Coordination rates in any two
communication treatments are not significantly different (see Table 3).
In Figure 3 the outcomes are decomposed in initial (1-3), intermediate (4-
6) and final rounds.19 In NoCom, Private and Both, coordination on the domi-
nated equilibrium increases over rounds, peaking above 80 percent in the final
rounds. In Public, the proportion of groups playing the PDE slightly increases
from 50 percent in the initial rounds to 63 percent in the final rounds.20 Thus,
the difference in the distributions between Public and the other treatments per-
sists.
The lower coordination rate on pure strategy Nash equilibria in NoCom is
explained by large miscoordination in the initial periods. In the final rounds,
there are no statistical differences of coordination rates between any two treat-
19We use this decomposition to disentangle first responses from limiting outcomes.
20The slight decline we observe in the central rounds is not significant.
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Overall distr. Frac. XXX
KS test (P-val) WRS test (P-val)
PRIV BOTH NOCOM PRIV BOTH NOCOM
PUB 0.778 1.000 0.889 3.518 3.552 3.552
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
PRIV .222 0.333 0.607 −0.506
(.96) (.59) (.54) (.62)
BOTH 0.222 0.053
(.96) (.96)
TABLE 2: AGGREGATE OUTCOMES ACROSS TREATMENTS
Rounds 1-8 Rounds 7-8
WRS test (P-val) WRS test (P-val)
PRIV BOTH NOCOM PRIV BOTH NOCOM
PUB 1.27 1.10 −2.79 −0.76 −1.40 0.90
(.20) (.27) (.01) (.45) (.16) (.37)
PRIV −0.10 −1.59 −0.54 −0.10
(.92) (.11) (.59) (.92)
BOTH −1.91 −0.462
(.05) (.64)
COM∗ −2.58 0.226
(.01) (.82)
∗ aggregate communication treatments.
TABLE 3: COORDINATION ACROSS TREATMENTS
ment (see Table 3).21
Result 1. Coordination on pure strategy Nash equilibria is higher with communica-
tion than without, but this difference shrinks with experience.
Result 2. Coordination on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium is sustained only in Pub-
lic. In the other treatments, play converges to the dominated equilibrium.
These results match the implications of the theoretical analysis.
Figures 4 - 6 display the ex-post probability of reaching an outcome, given
the profile of last-stage messages. In Public (Figure 4), the probability of achiev-
ing the PDE, given that an agreement to play it has been reached, is stable
around .8 after the first round (solid black line). The decline in the occurrence
21The results on coordination rates also hold against a permutation test on means, as well
as a binomial test on the original data – i.e. not averaging within each matching group.
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FIGURE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF OUTCOMES OVER ROUNDS
of the PDE in the central rounds, and the recovery that follows, are explained
by a decline in the number of agreements reached (dashed black line). The
probability of playing the dominated equilibrium after a credible agreement
to play it is one (solid dark gray line). If no agreement is reached, the proba-
bility of playing the dominated equilibrium oscillates between .2 and 1 (solid
light gray line).22
With the exception of the first two rounds, the PDE is never reached under
Private and Both (Figures 5 and 6), even when every player sends only message
x (solid black lines). Conversely, if every player sends or receives at least one
y message, a group is almost certain to play the dominated equilibrium (solid
light gray lines). These message profiles happen more than half of the time in
Private. In Both they represents more than 80 percent of the profiles in the last
rounds (dashed light gray lines).
Exactly two players exchanged at least one y message privately with prob-
ability around one third, across all rounds, in Private. This figure peaks at .6
in the first two periods in Both, then declines, though still recording a .4 in
the sixth round (dashed dark gray lines). Those messages profiles give two
22The dashed lines represent the probability of the corresponding message profiles.
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FIGURE 4: OUTCOMES CONDITIONAL ON MESSAGES - Public
FIGURE 5: OUTCOMES CONDITIONAL ON MESSAGES - Private
15
FIGURE 6: OUTCOMES CONDITIONAL ON MESSAGES - Both
players the opportunity to let the third down by reaching the XYY outcome.
The probability of the XYY outcome conditional on these message profiles
is between .5 and .6 in the first five rounds in Private, then declines to .4. In
Both, the same figure is generally higher, peaking above .8 in round five, still
above .5 in round seven (solid dark gray lines). Overall, it is remarkably high,
and suggests that some agents believe the received messages even when they
are not credible, while others try to exploit this tendency.
4.2 Actions, messages and beliefs
Action X is chosen 65 percent of the time in Public, 22, 21, and 15 percent
in NoCom, Private, and Both, respectively. Figure 7 displays the fraction of X
actions conditional on the observed messages in the last stage of communi-
cation, and for initial, intermediate and final rounds. In Public, subjects play
X more than 80 percent of the time following an agreement to do so. If no
agreement is reached, around one third of the subjects initially chooses X, but
this fraction drops below 15 percent in the last rounds.23 In Private and Both,
the agreement to play Y with at least one group member is sufficient to induce
23We already know from Figure 4 that everybody stick to agreements to play Y.
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FIGURE 7: FRACTION OF X ACTIONS CONDITIONAL ON OBSERVED MESSAGES
action Y.24 When players observe only message x, in the initial rounds they
respond by playing X around 80 percent of the time, as in Public. As they gain
experience, they learn not to trust these messages, but more than one third of
the subjects still chooses X in the final rounds.
Table 4 shows how communication decisions evolved over rounds. It re-
ports, for each treatment, the distribution of messages that are sent in the
last stage of communication, round by round. In Public, x prevails across
all rounds. In Private, the fraction of messages xx declines over rounds from
above 6o percent to around 30. The converse happens to message xy, which
steadily accounts for the majority of the messages in the second half of the
experiment. In Both public messages x, combined with either xx or xy private
messages account for between 75 and 90 percent of all messages. As in Private,
the former declines steadily across rounds, accounting for around one fifth of
the messages in the second half, while the latter increases up to around 60
percent from round 4 on.
The messages that are weakly dominated under our theoretical framework
24For treatment Both we do not condition on the observed public messages. The reason is
that, when it is observed in public, some message y is observed also in private.
17
PUB PRIV BOTH
x y xx xy yy x-xx x-xy x-yy y-xx y-xy y-yy
1 .85 .15 .65 .26 .09 .44 .43 .02 .00 .02 .09
2 .90 .10 .48 .39 .13 .37 .50 .00 .00 .02 .11
3 .77 .23 .33 .52 .15 .20 .46 .06 .02 .09 .17
4 .77 .23 .46 .41 .13 .30 .61 .00 .00 .00 .09
5 .83 .17 .41 .52 .07 .19 .57 .04 .02 .06 .13
6 .83 .17 .35 .52 .13 .22 .61 .04 .00 .06 .07
7 .96 .04 .28 .63 .09 .13 .63 .09 .00 .04 .11
8 .94 .06 .30 .54 .16 .20 .52 .03 .02 .02 .20
Avg .86 .14 .41 .47 .12 .27 .54 .03 .01 .04 .12
TABLE 4: LAST MESSAGE SENT IN EACH TREATMENT
are rarely sent. The overall percentage ranges between 12 percent in Private
and 19 percent in Both, with no significant difference across treatments, and
no clear pattern across rounds. The presence of these messages may be in-
terpreted as an instance of preferences for promise keeping. This motivation
appears minor for our subjects, especially when one considers that half of the
time subjects send different messages to their partners, thus necessarily lying
to one of them.
That communication strategies reflected an attempt to affect partner’s ac-
tions is confirmed by the distributions of first order beliefs.25 In Figure 8 each
circle represents a couple of beliefs, one for each partner. Beliefs are stated as
the probability that a partner chooses X. The dimension of the circles repre-
sents the frequency of each couple of beliefs. We overimpose the frontier of
beliefs where the best response switches from Y (below the solid black line) to
X (above it).26
As it should be expected at this point, in Public beliefs are concentrated on
higher values for each partner with respect to the other treatments. A more
subtle difference is present between Public and NoCom, on one side, and Pri-
vate and Both, on the other. While in the former beliefs mainly fall on the
bisector, where the same belief is reported for the two partners, in the lat-
ter a substantial share of players have divergent expectations regarding their
partners. In particular, the highest off-the-diagonal frequencies correspond to
expecting one partner to play Y, the other to play X, both with probability one.
25We also collected data on second order beliefs. The analysis of those shows no difference
with respect to first order ones. Thus, for brevity, we focus on first order beliefs in the main
text. Results on second order beliefs are reported in Appendix C.
26In each treatment the fraction of best response to beliefs is above 80 percent.
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FIGURE 8: DISTRIBUTION OF FIRST ORDER BELIEFS
We check for the significance of this result, by testing across treatments for the
difference in the absolute spread between each subject’s first order beliefs (Ta-
ble 5). A WRS rejects the null of equal differences in all pairwise comparisons,
except for Public and NoCom.27
Figure 9 shows how the first order belief regarding one partner depends on
the messages exchanged with him, for initial, intermediate, and final rounds.
In Public the relation between belief and messages is rather stable: players
trust messages if they reach an agreement, and are uncertain on what to ex-
pect if not. In Private and Both the players learn after the initial rounds to trust
agreements to play Y, even when they descend from an implicit consensus,
and independent of who is sending message y. If they both send x, they ini-
tially believe the message. Gradually, they learn this cannot be trusted. Still,
in the final rounds, they report an average probability that their partner plays
X close to 50 percent. These data suggest that communication affects beliefs
in all treatments.
27The joint distributions show a high frequency of beliefs around 50-50. The attraction to-
ward such intermediate reports may be explained by risk aversion: 50-50 is a risk-free report.
See also the analysis in Appendix C.
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WRS test (P-val)
PRIV BOTH NOCOM
PUB −3.468 −3.466 0.915
(.00) (.00) (.360)
PRIV −2.250 −3.401
(.024) (.00)
BOTH −3.311
(.00)
TABLE 5: INDIVIDUAL SPREAD IN FIRST ORDER BELIEFS
FIGURE 9: FIRST ORDER BELIEF CONDITIONAL ON EXCHANGED MESSAGES
We run a GLS panel regression model with random effects to formally as-
sess the effect of communication on beliefs.28 The model can be written as:
Bit = γ0 + γCCit + γWWit + γtt + uit + eit
where Bit is the first order posterior belief of individual i in round t, Cit is a set
of regressors that refer to the outcome of the communication phase, Wit is a set
28The opportunity to use time invariant regressors, a Hausman test, and the correlation
between errors and regressors obtained through a diagnostic fixed effect estimation all sug-
gested the random rather than the fixed effects model.
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of controls, including individual characteristic, such as attitudes toward trust
and risk aversion, and statistics on the past observed play, uit is the between-
individual error, and eit the within-individual error.
Messages are different objects in different treatments. As the regressors
are treatment specific, we first run treatment-by-treatment regressions. The
communication regressors include all messages observed by the subject, and
the interaction between the messages exchanged between the subject and the
group member to which the belief refers.29 For treatment Both, we collapse the
outcome of public communication in one dummy taking value 1 whenever
one or more public message y is sent (labeled y˜BOTHPUB in Table 6). The standard
errors are clustered at the matching group level.
One may be concerned that posteriors are the result of self-fulfilling priors:
players’ belief that induce communication strategies that end up confirming
the prior.30 In this case the causality would move from beliefs to communi-
cation, rather than the other way around. To address this concern we run a
similar model where we use as dependent variable the change in first order
beliefs, as measured by the difference between the posterior and the prior. A
positive (negative) difference indicates that the subject is more (less) confident
in his partner choosing action X after communication than he was before.
Table 6 reports the estimates for both models. The results indicate that mes-
sages communicating the intention to play Y induce beliefs to be significantly
revised downward. The highest coefficient in absolute terms is always that of
the message sent by the group member to whom the belief refers (yPUBj , yji).
Receiving a y from this player induces a 30-40 percentage points downward
revision of the first order belief.31 The message of the third group member
has a significant effect only under Public, where it is observed by everyone,
and not in the other treatments (yPUBk , yki). These results also hold when the
dependent variable is the change in beliefs (∆Bij).
The coefficient of the interaction of exchanged messages is always sig-
nificant and of opposite sign with respect to single messages (yPUBi ∗ yPUBj ,
yij ∗ yji). Thus it offsets the additive effect of the single messages when both
players send y. The overall effect on posterior beliefs is around four thirds of
the average effect of single y’s in Public and Both, and three halves in Private.
29The main coefficients should then be interpreted as the effect of a y message when the
interacted message is x.
30This concern is somewhat justified since we fail to find differences in the medians of
priors and posterior beliefs in Public and Private. See Appendix C.
31A change in beliefs of this magnitude is always sufficient to make Y a best response for
the player.
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PUB PRIV BOTH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bij ∆Bij Bij ∆Bij Bij ∆Bij
t 0.71 -0.89 -2.03 ∗∗∗ 0.61 -3.27∗∗∗ 0.80
(0.588) (0.680) (0.584) (0.426) (0.646) (0.959)
Y¯{j,k}PAST -12.05
∗∗∗ 8.73 -15.41∗∗∗ 2.34 -5.03∗∗ 10.29
(3.995) (4.67) (1.368) (3.20) (2.295) (6.354)
yPUBi -36.26
∗∗∗ -23.88∗∗∗
(6.204) (7.007)
yPUBj -41.28
∗∗∗ -40.30∗∗∗
(7.747) (7.219)
yPUBk -22.30
∗∗∗ -20.61∗∗∗
(3.007) (3.257)
yPUBi ∗ yPUBj 26.05∗∗ 23.45
(12.68) (15.36)
y˜PUBBOTH -9.18
∗∗∗ -9.91∗∗∗
(3.343) (2.459)
yij -24.74∗∗∗ -23.11∗∗∗ -31.90∗∗∗ -20.27∗∗∗
(3.693) (4.807) (3.899) (5.017)
yji -29.06∗∗∗ -28.30∗∗∗ -38.23∗∗∗ -37.80∗∗∗
(3.278) (3.589) (4.166) (6.358)
yik 3.06 1.159 2.99 2.71
(3.939) (4.874) (1.593) (2.593)
yki -2.73 -0.0795 -1.16 0.10
(2.449) (3.405) (2.839) (2.737)
yij ∗ yji 10.66∗∗ 9.80 22.14∗∗∗ 25.25∗∗∗
(5.277) (7.967) (4.581) (9.214)
γ0 51.28 -28.48 85.61∗∗∗ -20.81 65.31∗∗∗ -15.07
(31.34) (24.31) (14.49) (11.30) (7.783) (16.25)
N 672 672 756 756 756 756
Matching groups 8 8 9 9 9 9
R-squared 0.548 0.323 0.493 0.263 0.503 0.235
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the matching group level)
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Controls include a set of individual characteristics, including risk aversion and trust measures.
TABLE 6: FIRST ORDER BELIEFS: WITHIN-TREATMENT GLS ESTIMATES
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(1) (2)
Bij ∆Bij
t -1.42∗∗∗ -0.311
(0.511) (0.435)
Y¯{j,k}PAST -13.69
∗∗∗ 6.07∗∗
(1.592) (2.510)
observes_y -26.90∗∗∗ -24.69∗∗∗
(4.045) (4.459)
Public 13.75∗∗ -3.535
(6.272) (5.506)
Both 7.416 1.584
(5.581) (5.487)
observes_y*Public -18.92∗∗ -13.96∗∗
(8.754) (6.794)
observes_y*Both -8.22 -6.190
(6.620) (6.538)
γ0 75.35∗∗∗ 2.852
(9.104) (9.176)
N 2184 2184
Matching groups 26 26
R-squared 0.417 0.123
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the matching group level)
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Controls include a set of individual characteristics,
including risk aversion and trust measures.
TABLE 7: FIRST ORDER BELIEFS: ACROSS-TREATMENT GLS ESTIMATES
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Results for the change in beliefs are similar, though some coefficients for the
interaction are not significant.
A downward time trend on posterior beliefs is present in Private and Both.
The average number of Y choices by past partners also negatively affects be-
liefs (y¯PAST). Both effects disappear if we look at changes in beliefs. A possible
interpretation is that those two variables primarily affect prior beliefs, while
communication determines the change between priors and posteriors.
The previous estimates show that communication affects beliefs in all treat-
ments. To test whether they do so to a similar extent, we run a version of the
previous models over all treatments. We collapse the communication vari-
ables into one dummy regressor (observes_y), taking value one whenever a
player has observed at least one y in the last stage of communication, and we
interact this dummy with the treatments (base treatment: Private; see Table 7).
The coefficients again show an impact of communication in all treatments,
with a stronger effect in Public. In particular the posterior belief is on average
13.7 percentage points higher in Public with respect to Private after observing
only message x, while Both does not differ significantly from the base. Observ-
ing at least one y, shifts beliefs downward of about 27 percent in Private and
Both. The same figure is 45.8 percent in Public (−26.9− 18.9), so that, summing
up the effects, the average belief for those that observe y messages is about 5
percent lower in Public than in the other treatments.32 Again, similar results
are obtained by focusing on changes in beliefs. The insignificant main effect
of Public tells there is no difference in how players update their beliefs after
observing only x. Thus the corresponding positive coefficient found in model
(1) is due to higher priors in Public. As before, observing y results in a larger
revision of the beliefs in this treatment, but a significant revision happens in
Private and Both as well.
Result 3. Communication affects beliefs in all treatments. The effect is stronger in
Public.
Thus, despite the comparative statics across treatments are in line with
theory, we reject the hypothesis that communication is disregarded in Private
and Both.
32(+13.7− 26.9− 18.9)− (−26.9).
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5 Conclusion
When equilibria are Pareto-ranked, coordination problems can lead to inef-
ficient outcomes. The fact that everybody would be happy to coordinate on
Pareto-superior equilibria suggests that communication could help the agents
to reach the Pareto-dominant outcome. Results in two-by-two games have
generally supported this view. The paper presents an experiment on pre-play
communication in a three-player coordination game with Pareto-ranked equi-
libria. We implement three different communication structures: subjects are
allowed to send one public message to the two other players (Public), one
private message to each other player (Private), or both public and private mes-
sages (Both).
Backed by theoretical analysis, we hypothesize that subjects should com-
municate and play the Pareto-dominant equilibrium only when communica-
tion is public. When pair of agents exchange messages privately, the players
should play the Pareto-dominated equilibrium, and disregard communica-
tion.
The aggregate results conform to these predictions. In Public, communica-
tion sustains the Pareto-dominant equilibrium, which is never played when
communication is absent. Thus, public communication alone replicates the
efficiency-enhancing effect that communication has in two-player games [e.g.
Charness, 2000]. If private messages are allowed, as in Private and Both, the
players end up in the dominated equilibrium. This happens because lying is
prevalent in these treatments, which makes efficient coordination impossible.
Thus, our results suggest caution in generalizing the effect of pre-play com-
munication in two-player games to larger ones. The idea that efficient coor-
dination may be reached through communication rests on equilibria being
Pareto-ranked. We have shown the importance of also considering how the
interests of various groups of players are aligned outside equilibrium, and
whether the available communication structure allows those groups to coor-
dinate.
In particular, this latter element – i.e. who can talk with whom – plays
a central role. The credible equilibrium notion, proposed by Grandjean and
Mantovani [2014] as an extension of standard models of credibility to games
with more players, precisely predicts the aggregate outcomes under differ-
ent communication structures, as well as the communication strategies of the
subjects.
The mechanics of credibility, however, are not straightforward to grasp,
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and subjects do not realize immediately when they can trust messages. In the
first rounds, players respond similarly to the observed messages in all treat-
ments. Even in the last ones, beliefs react to messages also in Private and Both,
though to a smaller extent with respect to Public. Thus, the effects of pre-play
communication, and of its structure, will generally depend also on how expe-
rienced the players are. As the widespread and persistent tendency to believe
to messages that we detect is hardly matched by the subjects’ preferences for
truth-telling, groups of players use communication to cheat on their partners,
and exploit naivety for their own interests.
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A Experimental instructions
Welcome to this experiment in decision-making. You will receive 5 ACas a
show-up fee. Please, read carefully these instructions. The amount of money
you earn depends on the decisions you and other participants make. In the
experiment you will earn ECU (Experimental Currency Units). At the end of
the experiment we will convert the ECU you have earned into Euro according
to the rate: 1 Euro = 10 ECU. You will be paid your earnings privately and
confidentially after the experiment. Throughout the experiment you are not
allowed to communicate with other participants in any way. If you have a
question please raise your hand. One of us will come to your desk to answer
it.
The experiment consists of 8 identical rounds. At the beginning of every
round the computer will pair you with two other participants in this room
(labeled Partner 1 and Partner 2). Thus, you will form a new group in every
new round and you will never play twice with the same group. In each round
you will choose between 2 options, labeled A and B. You will have 30 seconds
to make your choice. After you and your partners have chosen, you will be
informed about the choice of your partners and of the ECUs you earned for
the round. Your earnings will be determined according to the following four
cases:
• Case 1: you and your partners all choose A. Everybody earns 80 ECU
• Case 2: you and your partners all choose B. Everybody earns 40 ECU
• Case 3: among you and your partners, two persons choose A and one
person chooses B. Everybody earns 0 ECU.
• Case 4: among you and your partners, one person chooses A and two
persons choose B. The person that chooses A earns 0 ECU. The persons
that chose B earn 160 ECU.
[Treatment PUBLIC] Before you make your choice, you will be asked to
communicate with your partners about which choice you intend to make. You
will complete the message "I intend to choose:" with A or B. You will send one
message to both of your partners. When you and your partners have sent the
messages, you will be informed about the content of the messages that were
sent to you. You will repeat this procedure 4 times; thus there will be 4 stages
of communication, and you will have two minutes to complete all of them.
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After that you will make your choice as explained before. The messages that
are sent do not limit your choice.
[Treatment PRIVATE] Before you make your choice, you and your part-
ners will be asked to communicate with your partners about which choice
you intend to make. You will complete the message "I intend to choose:" with
A or B. You will send one message to each of your partners; thus you will send
two messages. You can send the same message or different messages. When
you and your partners have sent the messages, you will be informed about
the content of the messages that were sent to you. You will repeat this proce-
dure 4 times; thus there will be 4 stages of communication, and you will have
two minutes to complete all of them. After that, you will make your choice as
explained before. The messages that are sent do not limit your choice.
[Treatment BOTH] Before you make your choice, you and your partners
will be asked to communicate with your partners about which choice you
intend to make. You will complete the message "I intend to choose:" with A
or B. You will send one message to each of your partners and one message to
both of your partners; thus, you will send three messages. You can send the
same message or different messages. When you and your partners have sent
the messages, you will be informed about the content of the messages that
were sent to you. You will repeat this procedure 4 times; thus there will be
4 stages of communication, and you will have two minutes to complete all of
them. After that you will make your choice as explained before. The messages
that are sent do not limit your choice.
[All treatments] You will be also asked to state your beliefs both about
your partners choice and about their beliefs regarding your own choice. For
each of your partners you will be asked to complete two tasks, stating: a)
a number between 1 and 100, representing the probability with which you
think he will choose action A ; b) a number between 1 and 100, representing
the probability with which you think he thinks you will choose action A. Thus
you will be asked to state four numbers, corresponding to four belief tasks.
The ECU you earn from the belief tasks depend on the accuracy of your beliefs.
In particular, for task a) you earn more ECU the closer you are to the actual
decision of your partner; for task b) you earn more ECU the closer you are to
the number inserted by your partner in task a). The number of ECU you can
earn ranges between 0 and 25. We enclose two tables displaying the ECU you
earn in tasks a) and b), depending on your accuracy. Note that the ECU are
chosen so that it is in your best interest to always state what you truly believe.
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[Treatment NOCOM] You will state your beliefs after you made your choice.
[Treatments PUB,PRIV,BOTH] You will state your beliefs twice: before
the communication phase and after you made your choice.
[All treatments] You will be paid only for one of the 8 rounds of the game
and for only one single belief task you answered. At the end of the experiment,
one number between 1 and 8 will be selected at random by the computer, and
the corresponding game will be paid. The computer will select at random
another round, different from the previous, and one single belief task in that
round: the corresponding points will be paid. You will be informed of the cho-
sen rounds, of your final payoff in ECU and of the corresponding Euro. You
have reached the end of the instructions. It is important that you understand
them. If anything is unclear to you or if you have questions, please raise your
hand. To ensure that you understood the instructions we ask you to answer a
few control questions. The experiment will start after everyone has answered
these control questions correctly.
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Earnings in the belief tasks
Partner’s actual choice
A B
Your belief
0 0 25
10 4.75 24.75
20 9 24
30 12.75 22.75
40 16 21
50 18.75 18.75
60 21 16
70 22.75 12.75
80 24 9
90 24.75 4.75
100 25 0
TABLE 8: EARNINGS (ECU) FOR TASK a)
Partner’s belief in task a)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Your belief
0 25 24.75 24 22.75 21 18.75 16 12.75 9 4.75 0
10 24.75 25 24.75 24 22.75 21 18.75 16 12.75 9 4.75
20 24 24.75 25 24.75 24 22.75 21 18.75 16 12.75 9
30 22.75 24 24.75 25 24.75 24 22.75 21 18.75 16 12.75
40 21 22.75 24 24.75 25 24.75 24 22.75 21 18.75 16
50 18.75 21 22.75 24 24.75 25 24.75 24 22.75 21 18.75
60 16 18.75 21 22.75 24 24.75 25 24.75 24 22.75 21
70 12.75 16 18.75 21 22.75 24 24.75 25 24.75 24 22.75
80 9 12.75 16 18.75 21 22.75 24 24.75 25 24.75 24
90 4.75 9 12.75 16 18.75 21 22.75 24 24.75 25 24.75
100 0 4.75 9 12.75 16 18.75 21 22.75 24 24.75 25
TABLE 9: EARNINGS (ECU) FOR TASK b)
33
B Credible communication: formal model
B.1 Credibility
Let G be a normal form game defined by < N, (Aj)j∈N, (uj)j∈N >, where N
is the player set of cardinality n, Ai is the finite set of action of player i, and
ui : ×j∈N Aj→ R is player i’s von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. We
refer to G as the stage game.
Let a communication structure beC= {C1,C2, ...,Cm}, where Ck⊆N. ΓC(G)
denote the game G preceded by one round of preplay communication, ac-
cording to the coalition structure C. In each coalition C, each player i ∈ C
communicates a message about his intended action mi,C ∈ Ai to the members
of coalition C. All messages are sent simultaneously.
Take a group of agents C ∈ C and a message profile in that group mC ∈
×j∈C Aj. The message profile mC is self-committing if each group member is
better off by playing his message when he trusts the message of the others, for
every possible belief about the play of nonmembers.
Definition 1. The message profile mC ∈ ×j∈C Aj is self-committing if
ui(mC,αN\C) ≥ ui(ai,mC\{i},αN\C) for all i ∈ C, for all ai ∈ Ai, for all αN\C ∈
×j∈N\C∆Aj.
A message profile that is not self-committing leads to a consensus to play
an action profile if (i) the players who do not play according to their message
choose a best-response to the message of those who stick to it, (ii) the message
of the players who stick to it is a best-response to the play of the consensus,
and (iii) there is no other action profile satisfying (i) and (ii).
Definition 2. A message profile mC ∈ ×j∈C Aj that is not self-committing leads to
the consensus aC ∈ ×j∈C Aj if
(i) aC = (mC′ , aC\C′) for some C′ ⊂ C with C′ 6= ∅, where ai satisfies
ui(ai,mC′ ,αN\(C′∪{i})) ≥ ui(a′i,mC′ ,αN\(C′∪{i})) for all i ∈ C\C′, for all a′i ∈
Ai, for all αN\(C′∪{i}) ∈ ×j∈N\(C′∪{i})∆Aj.
(ii) ui(mi, aC\{i},αN\C) ≥ ui(a′i, aC\{i},αN\C) for all i ∈ C′, for all a′i ∈ Ai, for all
αN\C ∈ ×j∈N\C∆Aj.
(iii) There is no aC ∈ AC\{aC} satisfying (i) and (ii).
A message profile leads to an agreement if it is self-committing or if it leads
to a consensus.
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Definition 3. Following the message profile mC ∈ ×j∈C Aj, an agreement to play
aC ∈ ×j∈C Aj is reached in the group C ∈ C if aC = mC and mC is self committing,
or if mC leads to the consensus aC.
For C ∈C, and mC ∈×j∈C Aj, let Ag(mC) be the agreement reached follow-
ing the message profile mC, and let Ag(C) = ∪mC∈AC Ag(mC). An agreement
is credible in a group if no members of that group could gain by following an
agreement reached in another group they also belong to.
Definition 4. An agreement to play aC in the group C ∈ C is credible if for all
C′ ∈ C such that C ∩ C′ 6= ∅ and for all bC′ ∈ Ag(C′), ui(aC,bC′\C,αN\(C∪C′)) ≥
ui(aC\C′ ,bC′ ,αN\(C∪C′)) for some i ∈ C ∩ C′ such that ai 6= bi, for all αN\(C∪C′) ∈
×j∈N\(C∪C′)Aj.
For C∈C, and mC ∈×j∈C Aj, let Ag∗(mC) be the credible agreement reached
following the message profile mC.
B.2 Credibility in the Coalitional Prisoners Dilema
We consider three types of coalition structure: CPUB = {{i, j,k}}, CPRIV =
{{i, j},{i,k},{j,k}} and CBOTH = {{i, j},{i,k},{j,k},{i, j,k}}. We let ΓPUB(G)
denote the coalitional prisoners dilema G preceded by one round of public
preplay communication, and we let ΓPRIV(G) and ΓBOTH(G) be defined ac-
cordingly.
In ΓPUB(G), the message profiles m = (x, x, x) and m′ = (y,y,y) are self-
committing since they are associated to the pure Nash equilibria of the game.
The message profile (x,y,y) leads to a consensus to play (y,y,y) while the
profile (x, x,y) does not lead to a consensus. Agreements are credible since
there are no conflicting agreements that could be reached in other groups.
In ΓPRIV(G), the only self-committing message profile in a group C is mC =
(y,y). The message profiles mC ∈ {(x,y), (y, x)} lead to the consensus (y,y)
while the message profile mC = (x, x) does not lead to a consensus. Players
may only agree privately to play Y. As a result, every agreement to play Y is
credible.
In ΓBOTH(G), the public message profile m{i,j,k}= (x, x, x) leads to an agree-
ment to play the Pareto dominant equilibrium. However, it is not credible
since any group of two agents could agree on the play of (Y,Y), which is pay-
off improving for those two agents. Every agreement to play Y in a group of
two agents is credible since the other agreements that could be reached either
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involve the play of Y, or involve the play of X by the three players. In that case,
the two agents are better off under their initial agreement. Every agreement
to play Y in a group of three players is credible since every other agreement
involve the play of Y.
B.3 Credible equilibrium
In ΓC(G), let ci = #{C ∈ C | i ∈ C}. Let mi,C ∈ Ai be the message of player i
in the group C. Let mi = (mi,C)C∈C|i∈C ∈ Acii be a message profile for player i.
For C ∈ C, let mC = (mj,C)j∈C ∈ ×j∈C Aj be a message profile in group C. Let
m = (mC)C∈C ∈ ×C∈C(×j∈C Aj) be a message profile in each group. Let mi =
(mC)C∈C|i∈C ∈×C∈C|i∈C(×j∈C Aj) be a message profile in each group C involv-
ing player i. The strategy of a player i is σi = (pi, fi), where pi : A
ci
i → [0,1] is a
probability distribution over his messages profiles such that ∑mi∈Acii
pi(mi) =
1, and fi : ×C∈C|i∈C(×j∈C Aj)→ ∆Ai is a mapping from the set of messages
observed by player i to a probability distribution over his action. The ex-
pected utility of player i given the strategy profile σ= (σ1,σ2, ...,σn) is Ui(σ) =
∑a∈A ui(a)[∑m∈×C∈C(×j∈C Aj) p(m)Πj∈N f j(aj | mj)], where p(m) =Πj∈N pj(mj).
A credible equilibrium is a Perfect Bayes Nash equilibrium of the game
with pre-play communication where it is common knowledge that credible
agreements are believed and played.
Definition 5. The strategy profile σ= (p, f ) is a credible equilibrium of ΓC(G) if for
each player i ∈ N,
(i) pi(mi) > 0⇒ mi ∈ argmaxm′i∈Acii Ui((m
′
i, fi),σ−i)
(ii) For all mi ∈ ×C∈C|i∈C(×j∈C Aj).
a. If aC ∈ Ag∗(mC) for some C ∈ C such that i ∈ C, then fi(ai | mi) = 1,
b. Otherwise,
fi(ai | mi) > 0 =⇒ ai ∈ arg maxa′i∈Ai ∑a−i∈A−i u(a
′
i, a−i)
∏j 6=i∑m˜j∈×C∈C|j∈C(×k∈C Ak) f j(aj | m˜
j)µi(m˜j | mi)
where for all j and m˜j, µi(m˜j | mi) = ∏k∈N∑m̂k∈Ackk |m̂k,C=m˜k,C∀C|j,k∈C pk(m̂k |
mi) is player i’s assessment of the probability player j observes m˜j, given the
equilibrium choice of messages by the agents p and his observation mi, com-
puted using Bayes rule when possible.
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Condition (i) of Definition 5 requires that the choice of message of each
player is optimal. Condition (ii.a) imposes that credible agreement are played.
Condition (ii.b) requires that when a credible agreement is not reached, a
player chooses an optimal action given the expected play of others, by de-
riving the observation they might get from the optimal choice of messages of
each player, updated by his own observation according to Bayes rule. Notice
that Condition (ii) should hold for all observation a player might get, not only
on the equilibrium path.
B.4 Credible equilibrium in the Coalitional Prisoner’s dilemma
In ΓPUB(G), ml ∈ {x,y}, pl(x) + pl(y) = 1, mi = mj = mk = (mi,mj,mk) = m.
Since each player’s observation is identical, player i’s assessment of the prob-
ability player j observes m˜j is
µi(m˜j | mi) =
1 if mi = m˜j0 if mi 6= m˜j
For each player l ∈ {i, j,k}, credibility implies fl(x | (x, x, x)) = 1 and fl(y |
m) = 1 for m ∈ {(y,y,y), (x,y,y), (y, x,y), (y,y, x)}. Players coordinate on a
Nash equilibrium of the CPD, if m ∈ {(x, x,y), (x,y, x), (y, x, x)}. The follow-
ing matrix represents the payoff of the agents for each message profile, given
the role of communication on play. In the matrix, z1 = 8 if fl(x | (y, x, x)) = 1,
z1 = 5,18 if fl(x | (y, x, x)) = 1+
√
2
3 and z1 = 4 if fl(x | (y, x, x)) = 0, and z2 and
z3 are defined accordingly. This matrix thus defines 27 one shot game. Each
Nash equilibrium of this one-shot game is associated to a credible equilibrium,
as shown hereafter.
x y
x 8,8,8 z2,z2,z2
y z1,z1,z1 4,4,4
x
x y
x z3,z3,z3 4,4,4
y 4,4,4 4,4,4
y
FIGURE 10: PAYOFFS IN THE CONTINUATION GAME
There are four classes of credible equilibria. For each candidate we iden-
tify the choice of message by each player and the choice of action when an
agreement is not reached. When an agreement is reached, the players play it.
(i) Each player sends a message y and the players coordinate on any of
the Nash equilibria of the game if they do not reach an agreement. Formally,
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pl(x) = 0; fl(x | m) = f for l ∈ {i, j,k}, where f ∈ {0, 1+
√
2
3 ,1} and
m ∈ {(x, x,y); (x,y, x); (y, x, x)}.
(ii.a) Players 1 and 2 send y while player 3 sends x with positive probabil-
ities. If they do not reach an agreement and player 1 or player 2 are the play-
ers who have announced their intention to play Y, players coordinate on the
dominated equilibrium. If the players do not reach an agreement and player
3 reveals y, they coordinate on any of the Nash equilibria.
Formally, p1(x) = p2(x) = 0; p3(x)∈]0,1], and for l ∈ {1,2,3}, fl(x | (y, x, x)) =
0; fl(x | (x,y, x)) = 0, fl(x | (x, x,y)) = f where f ∈ {0, 1+
√
2
3 ,1}.
(ii.b) and (ii.c) are symmetric to (ii.a).
(iii) Each player sends a message x and players coordinate on any of the
Nash equilibria of the game if they do not reach an agreement. Formally,
pl(x) = 1; fl(x | m) = f for l ∈ {1,2,3}, where f ∈ {0, 1+
√
2
3 ,1} and
m ∈ {(x, x,y); (x,y, x); (y, x, x)}.
(iv.a) Players 1 and 2 send x while player 3 sends y with positive proba-
bilities. If they do not reach an agreement and player 3 has announced his
intention to play Y, players coordinate on the Pareto dominant equilibrium. If
the players do not reach an agreement and players 1 (2) reveals y, they coordi-
nate on any of the Nash equilibria. Formally, p1(x) = p2(x) = 1; p3(x) ∈ [0,1[,
and for l ∈ {1,2,3}, fl(x | (x, x,y)) = 1; fl(x | (x,y, x)) = fl(x | (y, x, x)) = f
where f ∈ {0, 1+
√
2
3 ,1}.
(iv.b) and (iv.c) are symmetric to (iv.a).
The other candidates are not immune to individual deviations.33
Communicating y is a weakly dominated strategy. If communicating y af-
fects the payoff of a player, it leads to a lower payoff for that player. Sending
the message y leads to a strictly smaller expected payoff than sending the mes-
sage x if others communicate both messages with positive probabilities.
In ΓPRIV(G), credibility implies fl(y | ml) = 1 when
ml = (ml,{lk},mk,{lk},ml{l j},mj,{l j}) 6= (x, x, x, x). A strategy (pl, fl) for player l
such that pl(y,y) > 0 is weakly dominated. Indeed, player l would get a pay-
off of 4 by sending (y,y) while he would get 4α+ 16(1− α) by sending (x,y)
where α is the probability that a player observes only messages x and react to
331◦) Suppose p1(x) = 0, p2(x) ∈]0,1], p3(x) ∈]0,1[. Then, we should have fl(x | (y, x, x)) =
1 for l ∈ {1,2,3} to prevent the deviation by player 1 from p1(x) = 0 to p′1(x) = 1. It follows
that player 3 could profitably deviate to p′3(x) = 1.
2◦) Suppose p1(x) = 1, p2(x) ∈ [0,1[, p3(x) ∈]0,1[. Then, we should have fl(x | (x,y, x)) = 1
for l ∈ {1,2,3} to prevent the deviation by player 2 from p2(x) to p′2(x) = 1. It follows that
player 3 could profitably deviate to p′3(x) = 1.
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this by playing X. To simplify the analysis, we only discuss the credible equi-
libria involving strategies that are not weakly dominated, and we assume that
if a player sends exactly one message y, he sends it randomly to one of the two
partners. We show that the only symmetric credible equilibria of the game in
this class of candidates are such that players play the dominated equilibrium.
Proposition 1. The symmetric credible equilibria of the game such that p∗l (y,y) =
0 and p∗l (x,y) = p
∗
l (y, x) for l ∈ {i, j,k} are such that a) p∗l (x, x) ∈]0,1], f ∗l (x |
(x, x, x, x)) = 0, or b) p∗l (x, x) = 0, f
∗
l (x | (x, x, x, x)) ∈ [0,1].
Proof. Proof. Let σ∗ be a credible equilibrium. For l ∈ {i, j,k}, let p∗l (y,y) = 0,
p∗l (x,y) = p
∗
l (y, x) = pi/2, and f
∗
l (X | (x, x, x, x)) = φ. Credibility imposes
f ∗l (X | ol) = 0 for ol 6= (x, x, x, x). Using Bayes rules, we have µl(ol
′
= (x, x, x, x) |
ol = (x, x, x, x)) = ( 1−pi
pi/2+(1−pi))
2 for all l 6= l′.
Let λ(pi) = (2( 1−pi
pi/2+(1−pi))
2−
√
( 1−pi
pi/2+(1−pi))
2 + ( 1−pi
pi/2+(1−pi))
4)/3( 1−pi
pi/2+(1−pi))
2
be the value of φ such that a player observing (x, x, x, x) is indifferent be-
tween playing X or playing Y.34 There are three classes of equilibrium can-
didates for play in the stage game given pi: (i) φ = 1 when λ(pi) ≤ 1, (ii)
φ= 0 when λ(pi)≥ 0 and (iii) φ= λ(pi) when λ(pi) ∈]0,1[. Notice that φ(0) =
(2−√2)/3, ∂φ(pi)/∂pi < 0, and φ((20−√48)/22) = 0. Thus, the only equi-
librium candidates satisfying pi > (20−√48)/22 are such that φ = 1. When
pi ≤ (20−√48)/22, the three candidates satisfy sequential rationality at in-
formation sets where agents observes (x, x, x, x).
a) Suppose pi ∈ [0,1[.
(a.i) Suppose φ = 0, then Ul((p′l, f
∗
l ), (σ
∗
−l)) = 6pi
2 − 18pi + 16 > Ul(σ∗) =
11pi3 − 23pi2 + 8pi + 8 for any l ∈ {i, j,k}, for p′l(x,y) = 1, contradicting σ∗ is a
credible equilibrium.
(a.ii) Suppse φ = 1, then Ul(σ∗) = 4 = Ul(σ′l ,σ
∗
−l) for all l ∈ {i, j,k}, for all
σ′l 6= σ∗l .
(a.iii) Suppose
φ = (2( 1−pi
pi/2+(1−pi))
2 −
√
( 1−pi
pi/2+(1−pi))
2 + ( 1−pi
pi/2+(1−pi))
4)/3( 1−pi
pi/2+(1−pi))
2.
Then, Ul((p′l, f
∗
l ), (σ
∗
−i)) = 16− 12φ− 18pi + 18piφ+ 6pi2 − 6pi2φ > Ul(σ∗) =
pi3(11+ 9φ− 56φ2 + 36φ3) + pi2(−23− 37φ+ 168φ2 − 108φ3) + pi(8+ 52φ−
168φ2 + 108φ3) + 8− 24φ+ 56φ2 − 36φ3 for any l ∈ {i, j,k}, for all pi < (20−√
48)/22, where p′l(x,y) = 1, contradicting σ
∗ is a credible equilibrium..
34φ(pi) is the solution to ( 1−pi
pi/2+(1−pi) )
2(1 − φ)28 = 2( 1−pi
pi/2+(1−pi) )
2φ(1 − φ)16 +
( 1−pi
pi/2+(1−pi) )
2φ24+ (1− ( 1−pi
pi/2+(1−pi) )
2)4,
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b) Suppose pi = 1, then Ul(σ∗) = 4 = Ul(σ′l ,σ
∗
−l) for all l ∈ {i, j,k}, for all
σ′l 6= σ∗l , for all φ ∈ [0,1].
In ΓBOTH(G), we have seen that agents cannot credibly reveal their inten-
tion to play x. Following a private message y, an agent plays Y. When an
agent observes at most one public message y and only private messages x, he
should choose an optimal action given his equilibrium beliefs. As in the case
of private communication, the only symmetric equilibria of the game are such
that players choose Y.
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C Further results
Figures 11-12 and Table 10 report for second order beliefs the same statistics
we have discussed in the main text for first order ones. Results are similar. In
particular, in Private and Both more players think their partners have divergent
expectations on their action.
FIGURE 11: DISTRIBUTION OF SECOND ORDER BELIEFS
Table 10 shows the related tests. The null hypothesis is that the (median)
absolute spread between each subject’s second order beliefs is the same across
a pair of treatments. We reject this hypothesis for all pairwise comparisons.
Figure 12 shows how the second order belief regarding one partner de-
pends on the messages exchanged with him, for initial, intermediate, and fi-
nal rounds. The results mimic those of first order beliefs. In Public players
expect others to trust credible agreements. In Private and Both, if they both
send x, they initially think their message is believed. Gradually, they learn
this is not necessarily the case. When they send y, players expect themselves
to be trusted. However, when they send x, and receive y, they are on average
more uncertain on the belief of their partner. Thus, after an implicit consen-
sus, the identity of the sender, irrelevant for first order beliefs, makes some
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WRS test (P-val)
PRIV BOTH NOCOM
PUB −3.466 −3.466 2.505
(.00) (.00) (.01)
PRIV −2.163 −3.578
(.03) (.00)
BOTH −3.225
(.00)
TABLE 10: INDIVIDUAL SPREAD IN SECOND ORDER BELIEFS
difference for second order ones. In particular, the players seem to overstate
how much their messages are trusted.
FIGURE 12: SECOND ORDER BELIEF CONDITIONAL ON EXCHANGED MESSAGES
Tables 11 and 12 report the tests for differences in the distributions of first
and second order beliefs. Across treatments, the only significant differences
are recorded between Public and any of the other treatments. This holds for
both priors and posteriors. The table also reports on the differences between
prior and posterior beliefs within each treatment. Both the Wilkoxon signed-
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Before comm. (KST) After comm. (KST) After VS before
PRIV BOTH NOCOM PRIV BOTH NOCOM WSRT ST
PUB .779 0.875 0.875 .779 1.000 0.875 −0.980
(.005) (.001) (.001) (.005) (.000) (.001) (.327) (.289)
PRIV 0.333 0.222 0.222 0.222 −1.362
(.593) (.960) (.960) (.960) (.173) (.508)
BOTH 0.333 0.222 −2.667
(.593) (.960) (.008) (.004)
TABLE 11: ACROSS AND WITHIN TREAT. DIFFERENCES IN FIRST ORDER BELIEFS
ranks test (WSR) and the sign test (ST)35 fail to find a significant difference in
treatments Public and Private. This may be due to the fact that communica-
tion shifts beliefs toward more extreme values, so that positive and negative
differences between priors and posteriors compensate each other, leaving the
median unchanged.
Before comm. (KST) After comm. (KST) After VS before
PRIV BOTH NOCOM PRIV BOTH NOCOM WSRT ST
PUB .779 0.779 1.000 .779 1.000 1.000 0.560
(.005) (.005) (.000) (.005) (.000) (.000) (.575) (1.00)
PRIV 0.222 0.222 0.222 0.222 −1.007
(.960) (.960) (.960) (.960) (.314) (.508)
BOTH 0.333 0.222 −2.667
(.593) (.960) (.008) (.004)
TABLE 12: ACROSS AND WITHIN TREAT. DIFFERENCES IN SECOND ORDER BELIEFS
Theoretically, communication should not have a role on the choice of the
subjects beyond its effect through beliefs: for a given level of posterior beliefs,
having observed a y message should not affect the actual choice. To test for
this, we run a panel linear probability model (LPM) with random effects on
the actions chosen. The model can be written as:
P(ait = Y |, Bit,Cit, Zit) = β0 + BitβB + CitβC + ZitβZ + νit + ηit
where Zit is a set of controls, Bit refers to the beliefs of individual i in round t,
Cit to the outcome of communication, and νit and ηit are the between and the
within error term, respectively.
To understand if and how communication affects actual play at differ-
ent levels of posterior beliefs, we first build a single measure for the level of
first order beliefs, defined as the product between the two stated posteriors.36
35We use the sign test, on top of WSR test, because the distributions look hardly unimodal.
36The results are robust to different specifications of this measure (e.g. the minimum or
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Second, we transform it into a categorical variable that takes value low (L),
medium-low (ML), medium-high (MH) and high (H), when the level of be-
liefs belongs, respectively, to the first, second, third and fourth quartile of its
distribution. High beliefs (approximately) correspond to action X being the
best response. The best response is Y at lower levels of beliefs.37 We include
the already used dummy for the outcome of the communication phase, and
interact it with the treatments, and with the level of beliefs.
Table 13 reports the (aggregate) coefficients for each possible combination
of the interacted terms. The baseline combination corresponds to treatment
Private, MH beliefs,38 and observing no y message. Each coefficient represents
the spread in the probability of taking action Y with respect to this base com-
bination.
The comparison of coefficients in the same column represents the effect
of a change in the level of beliefs, given the treatment, and the outcome of
communication. The comparison of adjacent coefficients in the same row rep-
resents the effect of communication, within one treatment, for a given level
of beliefs. The treatment effect is measured by comparing coefficients in the
same row, given the content of communication. Apparently, communication
affects actions directly, on top of its effect through beliefs, and this happens
consistently across treatments.39
We plot the mean response of the dependent variable against different
combinations of the interacted variables in Figure 13. Under best response
to stated beliefs, the gray and the black points would overlap. There would
be no treatment differences, and the mean response would be 0 at high lev-
els of beliefs, 1 otherwise. The gap between the gray and the black lines then
represents the direct effect of communication on actions.
The across-treatment comparisons, conditional on having observed some
y (gray), show hardly any difference, qualitatively matching the best response
benchmark.40
the sum between the posteriors). The product captures the idea that, for choosing X, a player
must believe that both partners are playing X with a sufficiently high probability; it has also
the advantage that, at some level, it approximates pretty well the locus of beliefs where the
players should be indifferent between action X and Y.
37We choose to use a categorical variable for beliefs precisely because, theoretically, the
relation between beliefs and actions is not linear or continuous.
38The arithmetic mean of the original continuous variable falls in category MH.
39A probit version of the model gave similar results, but the interpretation and the devel-
opment that follows are much more immediate using a LPM. The estimates from this model,
from other specification of the beliefs variables, as well as those from treatment specific mod-
els that include a richer set of communication variables are available upon request.
40The only exception arises at high beliefs (H). However, note that those estimates come
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PUB PRIV BOTH
Observes y Observes y Observes y
Belief level No Yes No Yes No Yes
L .265∗ .279∗ .297∗∗ .297∗ .242∗ .304∗
(.1261385) (.128) (.112) (.120) (.122) (.121)
ML -.043 .343∗∗ .319∗ .301∗ .357∗∗ .320∗
(.176) (.129) (.127) (.120) (.121) (.123)
MH -.313∗ .210 BASE .301∗ -.236 .246
(.148) (.133) (.121) (.159) (.133)
H -.538∗∗ -.135 -.585∗∗ .053 -.560∗∗ -.304
(.136) (.154) (.127) (.273) (.134) (.188)
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the matching group level)
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
TABLE 13: ACTIONS: COEFFICIENTS FOR THE INTERACTION BELIEF QUAR-
TILE*TREATMENT*COMMUNICATION DUMMY
FIGURE 13: INTERCATION PLOT: MEAN RESPONSES FROM MODEL WITH CATEGORI-
CAL BELIEFS (QUARTILES)
from subjects declaring they are almost sure their partners will both play X, after having ob-
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The black points differ from the gray ones at intermediate levels of beliefs
(MH level in Private and Both, ML and MH in Public). They are close to the best
response benchmark at extreme levels. Thus, the content of communication
affects actions, given beliefs, when players report uncertainty on the others’
choices.
Incorrectly reported beliefs or departure from best response are alternative
explanations of this result. We have however no way to disentangle the two.
Players may incorrectly report beliefs if they are risk averse, for instance. In
that case, agents would report beliefs biased towards 50 percent, so that in
intermediate categories we would have subjects with different “true” beliefs.
If the latter are related to the content of communication, then this may separate
between different “true” levels of beliefs, even when the reported ones fall in
the same category. Departures from best response may occur, for instance, for
reasons of guilt or regret aversion. A player holding the beliefs that others
will not play X with sufficiently high probability, may nevertheless end up
playing X if he observes only x messages, because he does not want to deceive
the others in case they prove sincere.
served some y in the communication phase. They are based on a tiny number of observations,
from subjects with either a peculiar updating process or an incorrect belief reporting strategy.
Thus, we think they should not be taken too seriously.
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